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IMPLICATIONS OF THE TAx
REFORM PROPOSALS FOR
FRAUD
-OR-
HOW TO SHIFT To A
CONSUMPTION TAx
WITHOUT HELPING THE
CHEATERS
BY
KALYANI ROBBINS
KALYANI ROBBINS CONSIDERS THE IMPLICATIONS
THAT CURRENT TAX REFORM PROPOSALS HAVE
ON TAX COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT.
Introduction
One need only spend a few min-
utes searching the Internet to be
overwhelmed by the intensity of
the tax reform debate. In addi-
tion to the discussions among
scholars and specialists, there are
more grass roots movements
than one could possibly count.
Some of them seem credible, of-
ten pushing for one of the pro-
posals already being considered
by Congress, and others do noth-
ing but scream so loudly against
the IRS that you can almost hear
them through cyberspace. Orga-
nizations with names like Ameri-'1999 K. Robbins
cans for Fair Taxation, 1 Ameri-
cans for Tax Reform,2 Citizens
for an Alternative Tax System,3
Citizens for Tax Justice' and the
Great American Taxpayer's Revo-
lution' litter the Web, calling for
a better way but only rarely ex-
plaining in much detail just what
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that way should be. The one
thing everyone does seem to
agree upon, scholars and angry
citizens alike, is that the time has
come to "[shift] from the ques-
tion of whether to alter our cur-
rent tax system to the question
of how to alter it."6 Given the
strength of this mandate, it is
worth taking a moment to con-
sider the ramifications of reform
for tax cheating.
The vast majority of the pro-
posals on the table today are sim-
ply different implementation
mechanisms of the same basic
idea: a change in the tax base
from income to consumption.
The purpose of this article is to
consider the implications some
of these proposals have for the
enforcement of tax compliance
(prevention of cheating). For this
reason, it will only briefly address
the impetus for a consumption
tax and the policy considerations
behind it.7 The first part will also
give short descriptions of the pro-
posals that will be considered in
this article: the National Retail
Sales Tax, the Savings-Exempt
Income Tax and the Value-Added
Tax (VAT). Next, I will analyze
each of these proposals with re-
gard to the feasibility of evasion.
Finally, the article concludes that
with regard to the prevention of
tax-cheating, the VAT is the most
efficient of these proposals. In
light of the fact that in most
other respects they are effectively
the same (they all tax the same
base at what would become the
same amount after determining
revenue needs and effectively op-
erate to encourage saving and
boost the economy through in-
vestment), I would endorse a VAT
in order to discourage cheating
and to take the burden of com-
pliance out of the hands of the
average citizen.
Taxing Consumption
What reason is there, that he
which laboureth much, and
sparing the fruits of his labor,
consumeth little, should be
charged more, than he that liv-
ing idlely, getteth little, and
spendeth all he gets: Seeing
that one hath no more pro-
tection from the common-
wealth than the other?8
Fairness to those who are ca-
pable of delayed gratification is
only one of the many reasons that
people in the United States are be-
ginning to seriously consider a
move toward a consumption tax
(though it is key to distinguish be-
tween excessive consumption and
poverty conditions that cause
people to spend all of what they
earn-this can be taken into ac-
count through progressive rates
and standard deductions.) An-
other important consideration is
that just about every consumption
tax proposal, even the fairly com-
plex VAT, is significantly easier to
report and collect than our cur-
rent income tax and would there-
fore save time and money and in-
crease productivity.' Perhaps most
importantly from a policy per-
spective, taxing consumption en-
courages saving. Under our
present system, which rewards im-
mediate spending, the U.S. has
fallen behind almost every devel-
oped country in percent saved per
year.10 Not only will increased sav-
ings benefit future generations di-
rectly," but it will also provide
funds today that can be invested
in business and boost the
economy," which is good for all
generations.
One consumption based tax re-
form proposal is the National Re-
tail Sales Tax. This is exactly what
it sounds like. Instead of taxing
income at all, a tax of at least 15-20
percent (some argue much more
would be necessary) would be lev-
ied on all retail purchases. "In or-
der to tax only final consumption,
however, purchases by businesses
[would] be tax-exempt."13
Only retail businesses would be
responsible for reporting and pay-
ing the taxes they had collected, and
they would be reimbursed for the
added effort. These taxpayers would
remit the federal tax money to the
states, as they already do with state
sales tax in most states. The states
in turn would send it to the federal
government, less a one percent fee
for their trouble. In total, far fewer
individuals and entities would be
involved than with an income tax,
14
which would reduce the aggregate
cost of compliance. Regressivity
would be avoided through across
the board refunds in an amount
determined to be representative of
the cost of basic needs.
Another way to tax only con-
sumption and leave investment in-
come alone is the Savings-Exempt
Income Tax. Under this system,
taxes would still be collected from
individuals, eliminating some of
the efficiency benefits available
with the sales tax. It would, how-
ever, still provide the previously
discussed policy benefit of encour-
aging saving by deducting the
amount newly saved in a given year
from total income, effectively tax-
ing only that which is spent. This
method can also be more reliable
than a sales tax by accurately de-
termining the figure expended on
all consumption, not just the
spending that fits into the retail
sales (or other easily tracked trans-
fers such as those of homes and
automobiles) model. Progressivity
would be attained through very
large standard deductions, and in
some proposals, graduated rates. 5
Naturally, in order to make this
system feasible, the tax rates would
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still have to be higher on average
than they are now to make up for
the smaller tax base.
Finally, there is the method used
in many other countries, known
as the Value-Added Tax (VAT). The
VAT is a bit more complicated than
the other two systems discussed
herein, but is essentially a multi-
level sales tax, charged to provid-
ers rather than buyers (which ba-
sic economic theory tells us is ef-
fectively the same thing). Goods
and services generally go through
several stages (and pass through
several sets of hands) before reach-
ing the final purchaser. A VAT does
not involve charging the tax di-
rectly to the consumer, though he
or she will pay for it through
higher prices. Rather, it is a tax on
the difference in value between the
goods purchased for each stage of
production, and the thing pro-
duced at that stage. A company
would be taxed on its gross rev-
enues less the amount it spends on
supplies (but not wages). This fig-
ure represents the value that a given
company has added to those goods
as they move along the chain of
production, hence the name of the
tax. In effect, the value of the fi-
nal retail product is taxed, with
each business that contributed to
its final value paying in proportion
to the portion of that value it con-
tributed.
Because a VAT taxes consumers
by increasing the prices of the
goods they purchase, it does not
lend itself well to progressivity. All
consumers would have to pay the
same higher prices for what they
buy, regardless of their income lev-
els. Although politically difficult,
there are some ways to deal with
this problem. One would be to tax
different production chains at dif-
ferent levels, depending on
whether the goods produced are
deemed necessities or luxuries.
This determination, however, is
highly subjective. Another way
would be to give monthly checks
to low-income individuals in an
amount that reflects the tax they
are likely to be paying on their
necessities. Finally, we could give
people with lower incomes spe-
cial discount cards to use when
making purchases. The retailers
would then submit copies of the
receipts from these discounts to
the gov-
ernment
for reim-
burse-
ment (or
even just
deduct it
from the
tax they
pay, per-
haps). Re-
gardless of
nesses under-reporting their sales
to evade taxes. This would con-
tinue and possibly increase, as the
rewards of such tactics would be
higher when the taxes they pay
are no longer diminished by in-
cluding individual income taxes
in the overall revenue pool. In
other words, all tax dollars will
pass through retailers' hands. This
sort of cheating is one of the easi-
est to get away with, as there is
I WOULD ENDORSE A VAT IN ORDER TO
DISCOURAGE CHEATING AND TO TAKE
THE BURDEN OF COMPLIANCE OUT OF
THE HANDS OF THE AVERAGE CITIZEN.
the method used, if
any, there would still be one ben-
efit that we do not have under our
present tax system: the wealthy
would no longer be able to avoid
paying their share of taxes
through manipulation of the pro-
visions in the tax code. This may
offset the problems with making
a VAT progressive.
Possible Evasion
Tactics for Each
Proposal
NATIONAL RETAIL
SALES TAX
While a move to sales tax would
make it much more difficult for
individuals to cheat and elimi-
nate entirely the problems of false
deductions and unreported in-
come, it would also invite a host
of new opportunities for cheat-
ing. To realize this one need only
look at the common phenom-
enon, under existing law, of busi-
no other source of information
for the government to cross-ref-
erence with the retailer's report-
ing. At least with an income tax,
if an individual does not report
income, it is likely that the em-
ployer did. In contrast, with a
sales tax the consumers would
exit the store and have at that
point completed their role in the
process. We would depend al-
most entirely (and for the entire
tax revenue) on the retailers to
accurately report their sales and
submit the tax dollars to the
states. Add to that the complex-
ity of policy-related differential
taxation levels for different sorts
of goods, 16 and the fact that
some goods are sold both to fi-
nal consumers and to other busi-
nesses, and proper compliance
becomes even more difficult, even
for the honest.
A sales tax can also be evaded
on the individual level. First,
people could seek out "under the
table" sales, much like they do
now with employment. This
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would save them from paying the
(most likely quite large) sales tax,
and there would be an incentive
for sellers to participate in or-
der to make more sales and per-
haps charge a little bit more (but
still less than the price would
have been after the tax). Second,
consumers can avoid paying
what they feel to be an excessive
sales tax by purchasing higher
ticket items through the interna-
tional market.17 Finally, people
could create phony businesses
through which to make their
purchases, which would then be
exempt from the sales tax.
Of course, some of these dan-
gers could be avoided through
electronic means. Several propos-
als involve requiring that all pur-
chases be made with "personal
smart cards," allowing the gov-
ernment to collect sales taxes di-
rectly from the consumer, at the
point of sale. One such proposal
involves a special card that also
contains data on the consumer's
income level, allowing for a pro-
gressive sales tax rate. 8 Because
the card would be capable of im-
mediate funds transfer, the gov-
ernment would be able to collect
the tax electronically on the same
in-store device which would col-
lect the payment. This sugges-
tion, however, would do noth-
ing to prevent some people from
illegally selling goods for cash
in order to evade the tax. An-
other proposal involves some-
thing more like a typical ATM
card, to be used for most pur-
chases, but with continued legal
use of cash for small expendi-
tures. The government would re-
view the consumer's checking ac-
count at the end of each month,
and directly withdraw tax on the
total ATM amount (card pur-
chases plus cash withdrawals).' 9
This method does not suggest a
way to deal with credit card pur-
chases, though. Under either of
these methods, most of the eva-
sion techniques discussed above
would be impossible.
The fatal flaw in these elec-
tronic methods is that they are
overwhelmingly Orwellian. The
government would no longer
m e r e 1 y
track a
person s
employ-
ment his-
tory, in-
vestments
and those
purchases
he chose
to claim
as item-
ized de-
ductions
(which already leaves some
people feeling as though their
privacy has been violated, espe-
cially during an audit). Big
Brother would observe every-
where one went and everything
one purchased. There would
truly be no privacy left at all
with regard to an individual's
lifestyle choices. Ironically, pri-
vacy is one of the many reasons
some people have supported a
national sales tax in the first
place. 20 This level of invasion is
untenable, and besides, it is un-
likely that any workable elec-
tronic system could even be in
place within a reasonable num-
ber of years.
Finally, in addition to the
strong likelihood of cheating
under the National Retail Sales
Tax, the distribution of this cheat-
ing poses a greater risk to fairness
and to total revenue than under
other possible taxation regimes.
First, because the states will be
collecting and enforcing the tax,
it is likely that it will be enforced
differently in different parts of
the country. While there would
be a uniform federal requirement
of compliance, "[o]ne state's col-
lection efforts or interpretation
of the federal law might be more
aggressive than that of another
state.""1 This could result in un-
fair variations in effective (post-
cheating) taxation levels in dif-
ferent states, which would not
correlate to their representation
in Congress. The second problem
is the sheer volume of tax dollars
that could be lost. When only one
single stage of production is taxed
(as opposed to a VAT), if just one
party (the retailer) cheats, the en-
tire tax is lost, rather than merely
a portion of it.2
2
SAVINGS-EXEMPT
INCOME TAx
Under a Savings-Exempt Income
Tax we would be faced with ap-
proximately the same potential
for fraud as under the current sys-
tem, but with a few changes. The
problem of unreported income
would remain the same, and as-
suming we kept some of the cur-
rently available deductions, tax-
payers would continue to lie
about those, but there would also
be an entirely new problem. With
an unlimited new deduction
(saved/invested money) comes
incentive to claim more of it than
THE FATAL FLAW IN THESE ELECTRONIC
METHODS IS THAT THEY ARE
OVERWHELMINGLY ORWELLIAN...
THERE WOULD TRULY BE NO PRIVACY
LEFT AT ALL WITH REGARD TO AN
INDIVIDUAL'S LIFESTYLE CHOICES.
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one really has. This could be done
by selling previously held assets
(the proceeds of which would not
be reported as income) and pur-
chasing new ones (i.e. deductible
"new savings/investments") or
simply spending the proceeds (but
not paying the consumption tax
on that spending, as it does not
vanish from that year's income).2 1
Even if this could somehow be
avoided by determining the exact
amount and whereabouts of
everyone's assets before each tax
year began (which would be ex-
hausting), we would still have the
general problems of income tax
evasion.
VALUE-ADDED TAx
While no alteration of the method
of taxation could ever keep some
people from wanting to cheat on
their taxes, the beauty of a VAT is
that it makes it virtually impos-
sible to do so. There would be no
income reporting and no sepa-
rable tax charge on retail pur-
chases. In fact, although the con-
sumers would be effectively pay-
ing the tax through its reflection
in prices, they would seemingly
pay no tax at all, and therefore
have no way to withhold payment.
Because the actual taxpaying re-
sponsibility would be divided
among the various manufacturers
involved in any product, a VAT is
essentially self-enforcing. Each
producer will want to report the
amount spent on goods bought
from the company one step be-
hind it in the chain, in order to
subtract that amount from the
proceeds of its later sale of the
goods to the next link in the
chain, which will report that
amount for the same reason. In
other words, each link in the
chain of production has incentive
to police the one that comes be-
fore it. For a company in the
middle of the chain, there is prac-
tically no way to cheat.
Every production chain, how-
ever, has an end. As discussed,
there is nobody to police the re-
tail seller. The customers make
their purchases and leave, and
without invasive methods, there
is no way to cross-reference them.
The VAT, however, provides two
safeguards at the retail level that
do not exist under the sales tax
model. First, the penultimate
transaction has been recorded, 25
so there is
a record
of the
quantity NOT ONLY
of (let's
say) wid- DIRECTLY B
gets the CITIZENS
retailer ELIMI
bought. If
the re-
tailer sells
all of those widgets (as evidenced
by its purchasing more of them),
it will be expected to report gross
revenues somewhere in the neigh-
borhood of their market value,
or at least in an amount suffi-
cient to turn a net profit after
the subtraction of likely other,
non-deductible overhead ex-
penses. Second, not only can the
retailer only slightly underpay its
taxes because of these records,
but that figure will be negligible
in light of its diminished total
tax responsibility (relative to a
sales tax). Because the retailer
pays only one small portion of
the total tax, and can only cheat
on a very tiny part of that, and
because there are no other poten-
tial cheaters in the system, a VAT
is nearly cheat-proof. The only
way for meaningful fraud to take
place would be to elaborately co-
ordinate it among all of the links
in a particular production
chain.26 This would require the
consent of every entity involved,
which is far too unlikely to ad-
dress with any real concern.
Conclusion
While there is no such thing as
a good tax, the best we can hope
for is one that is less painful than
the current system, and which
can be more evenly applied
through the prevention of eva-
WOULD A VAT BE LESS
URDENSOME FOR MOST
... IT WOULD NEARLY
NATE CHEATING.
sion. Not only would a VAT be
less directly burdensome for
most citizens, but for the reasons
discussed, it would nearly elimi-
nate cheating. This would
quickly lead to a reduction in the
overall tax rate, as we would re-
gain the fortune lost each year
to fraud under our present sys-
tem. This would make almost ev-
eryone more content with the tax
system, and provide an addi-
tional boost to an economy al-
ready improved by the increase
in savings discussed above.
Alexander Pope said "[wihoever
hopes a faultless tax to see, hopes
what ne'er was, is not, and ne'er
shall be." 27 Truer words may
never have been spoken, but a
VAT might be the closest we can
come to attaining a livable, al-
beit imperfect, tax.
TAx COMPLIANCE AND THE VAT
ENDNOTES
Americans for Fair Taxation (visited Mar.
16, 1998) http://www.fairtax.org/
home.html.
2 Americans for Tax Reform, Mission State-
ment (visited Mar. 16, 1998) http://
www.atr.org/atr/atrmission.html.
Citizens for an Alternative Tax System,
CATS Overview (visited Mar. 16, 1998)
http://www.cats.org/start. html.
Citizens for Tax Justice, CTJ Information
(visited Mar. 16, 1998) http://
www.ctj.org/html/ctjdesc.html.
The Great American Taxpayer's Revolu-
tion, Better Way USA Plan (visited Mar.
16, 1998) http://www.noirs.com/noirs.
6 Americans for Fair Taxation, Advocacy
(visited Mar. 16 1998) http://
www.fairtax.org/advocacy/.
7 This discussion, if thorough, would be
its own law review article.
1 Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN 184 (Dutton
ed. 1914).
9 See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith,
Is the Debate Between An Income Tax
and a Consumption Tax a Debate About
Risk? Does It Matter?, 47 TAx L. REV. 377,
386 (1992) ("The consumption tax has
also been supported on the grounds that
it will be easier to administer.").
'0 See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Should We Tax
Consumption, and If So, How? (last
modified Mar. 14, 1996) http://
www.miicf.org/Policy/jobscapital/
jc 995_2/a06.html ("Our nation's net
national saving rate is running at less
than three percent per year - less than
one-third the rate observed in the 1 950s
and 1 960s. It is also among the lowest
of the developed countries. For example,
we are routinely saving at less than one-
third the rate of Japan and less than one-
half the rate of Germany.").
ii See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 9,
at 385 (Advocates of efforts to increase
savings are concerned about leaving "on
adequate stock of wealth for future gen-
erations.").
12 See Kotlikoff, supra note 10 (despite that
domestic investment can be financed by
foreigners, it nonetheless seems to cor-
relate over time with the national sav-
ings rate.)
"s Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Consumption-
Based Tax Reform and the State-Local
Sector: A Study for the American Tax
Policy Institute, 13 Am. J. TAx POL'Y 115,
135 (1996).
14 About 120 million tax returns are filed
each year. See David Stires, Ten Things
Tax Reformers Won't Tell You,
SMARTMONEY, Mar. 1, 1998, at 138.
15 For example, the Nunn-Domenici pro-
posal (which combines this method with
a VAT) provides for progressive income
tax rates.
16 For example, we might tax luxury items
at a higher rate than necessities, and
both may be available from the same
retailer.
17 See Arguments for a Consumption Tax
(visited Mar. 28, 1998) http://
www. ruf. rice ed u/- philip/
tax policy.html ("The international mar-
ket provides consumers the opportunity
to evade the consumption tax.").
18 See Daniel 2000, The Consumption Tax
(visited Mar. 28, 1998) http://
www.julai.net/economic/consum.html.
19 See Kotlikoff, supra note 10.
20 See, e.g., Great American Taxpayer's
Revolution, The Better Way USA Plan
(visited mar. 16, 1998) http://
www.noirs.com/noirs/plan.html (If we
abolish the income tax and the IRS, and
replace them with a sales tax, "we will
get our privacy back.").
2' Deloitte & Touche LLP, Fundamentals of
Tax Reform / Consumption Tax Propos-
als (visited Mar. 28, 1998) http://
www. dto n line. co m/taxref/
trcontax.htm#Consumption.
22 See id. ("The retail sales tax imposes tax
only at a single stage in the production
and distribution chain. This increases the
opportunity for the evasion of the entire
tax when just one party (the retailer) fails
to meet its taxpaying duty.").
23 See Kotlikoff, supra note 10 ("[H]ouseholds
could sell [their] assets and purchase new
ones, and claim the amount of the new
asset purchase as a tax deduction.").
24 One way to picture this is to imagine that
four people decide to purchase a pizza.
No one person would be able to avoid
paying his share, as the rest of them
would then be responsible for it. Each
member polices the others' contributions.
Because a VAT taxes the total value of
the final product, it is in the interests of
each manufacturer to ensure that the
others pay tax on the full values added
at their stages of production.
25 Even if the retailer and its provider
wanted to agree on a lesser quantity to
be recorded (to enable the retailer to
evade taxes on the value added to those
products and to allow the provider to re-
port less gross profits), they would run
into the same problem of the previous
transaction's having been recorded, and
so on. The need to under-report would
slide all the way up the chain, making it
much more risky and difficult.
26 See Deloitte & Touche, supra note 21
("The complete amount of tax is evaded
only when there is some coordination
between parties at different stages of the
production and distribution chain.").
27 Citizens for Tax Justice, Tax Quotes (vis-
ited Mar. 16, 1998) http://www.ctj.org/
html/quotes.htm.
TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE VAT
,!Z@
